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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Christopher Stephen Beadz appeals from the judgment of conviction for injury to 
jails, entered following his court trial. He asserts that his oral waiver of his right to a jury 
trial was not valid, and that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the 
district court's finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was guilty of injury to jails. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Beadz was charged by information with injury to jails based on the claim that 
he "did willfully and intentionally injure the Twin Falls County Jail by breaking a cell 
window, in violation of Idaho Code§ 18-7018." (R., p.42.) The case was tried to the 
court at the request of the attorneys 1 with a single witness, Deputy Jacob Benson, 
testifying. (See generally Tr.) 
The evidence at trial was essentially undisputed. Deputy Benson testified that 
Mr. Beadz was an inmate at the Twin Falls County Jail at the time of an incident in 
which the window in the door of his cell was broken. Mr. Beadz slammed his forehead 
into the window after becoming angry about disciplinary action that Deputy Benson had 
taken when Mr. Beadz violated jail rules. Deputy Benson then returned to Mr. Beadz's 
cell, noticed that the window in the cell door was broken, and saw Mr. Beadz standing in 
the middle of his cell, bleeding from his head and looking "woozy" and "dazed." Deputy 
Benson described the window as consisting of "pretty thick glass" and that he has seen 
other inmates bang into similar glass in the jail without it breaking.2 Immediately after 
1 See Supp.Tr., p.3, L.6 - p.5, L.14.) 
2 Deputy Benson testified that he had seen jail glass break some of the time when it has 
been hit. (Tr., p.25, Ls.13-22.) 
1 
the window broke, Mr. Beadz told Deputy Benson, "[y]ou know I didn't even mean to do 
it." (Tr., p.51, Ls.8-17.) In an interview with Deputy Benson the day after the incident, 
Mr. Beadz explained, "My head wasn't supposed to go through that glass. It hurt real 
bad." (Tr., p.54, L.15 - p.55, L.11.) In a phone call between Mr. Beadz and his father 
nearly six months after the incident, Mr. Beadz said, "I put my head through the window 
going after Benson when I picked up my first felony." (Tr., p.6, L.17 - p.26, L.7.) 
In closing argument, defense counsel's argument focused on whether Mr. Beadz 
had the requisite intent to injure the jail at the time that he banged his head against the 
window. Specifically, defense counsel argued that under the statute the State had to 
prove that at the time the person injures a jail "they have to intend more than just the 
act, which is what willfully covers, but they also have to intend the harm that's done, 
which is what intentionally covers." He went on to argue that Mr. Beadz was guilty of 
the lesser offense of misdemeanor malicious injury to property3 because he did not act 
with the intent to break the window. (Tr., p.61, L.6 - p.64, L.8.) 
The State responded by arguing: 
As far as why the legislature put both the words willfully and intentionally, 
because I would submit they are fairly synonymous and they basically 
define each other. I think that clearly where Mr. Beadz admits that he did 
put his head through that window, I think that this court should find that he 
did act both willfully and intentionally, as there was no accident and it was 
not a result of an involuntary action. This was a voluntary, intentional act, 
and I think he should suffer the consequences for his action. Otherwise, 
in any other criminal case a defendant could go around committing 
criminal acts and then say, gosh, I didn't really mean for that result to have 
happened. That certainly can't be a valid and complete defense to 
criminal acts. 
(Tr., p.65, L.13 - p.66, L.2.) 
3 Idaho Code§ 18-7001(1). 
2 
Ultimately, relying on State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 819 (2007), and State v. Nunes, 
131 Idaho 408 (Ct. App. 1998), both of which interpreted the malicious injury to property 
statute, the district court found Mr. Beadz guilty of injury to a jail. (Tr., p.67, L.22 - p.70, 
L.18.) Following sentencing, the district court entered a judgment of conviction for 
injuring jails. (R., pp.78-82.) Mr. Beadz then filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the 
judgment of conviction. (R., p.89.) 
3 
ISSUES 
1. Was Mr. Beadz deprived of his constitutional right to a jury trial when the district 
court held a court trial in the absence of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
waiver of that right? 
2. Was the evidence sufficient to support Mr. Beadz's conviction on the charge of 
injury to a jail where the State failed to prove that he intended to cause damage 




Mr. Beadz Was Deprived Of His Constitutional Right To A Jury Trial When The District 
Court Held A Court Trial In The Absence Of A Knowing, Intelligent, And Voluntary 
Waiver Of The Right 
A Introduction 
The district court accepted an oral waiver of Mr. Beadz's right to a jury trial at a 
hearing held two days before trial. At that hearing, defense counsel explained that he 
was requesting a court trial because, 
The reasoning is I think the issue that we have for the court on this case is 
really perhaps properly defined as a legal issue rather than - there is a 
factual component to it, but I thinks it's primarily a legal issue, so I think it's 
better as a court trial. I had that discussion with my client and he indicated 
he was okay with the court handling the trial rather than the jury. 
(Supp.Tr., p.3, Ls.16-24.) The district court then inquired as to whether the State 
concurred in defense counsel's request for a court trial, with the State explaining that it 
did. The State, defense counsel, and the district court then discussed scheduling of the 
trial, settling on one two days later, a Wednesday afternoon. (Supp.Tr., p.3, L.25 - p.4, 
L.19.) 
The district court then addressed Mr. Beadz on the issue for the first and only 
time, memorialized in the following exchange: 
THE COURT: I can certainly accommodate the parties doing that [having 
the trial on Wednesday afternoon]. In fact, I would like to because I just 
this afternoon received a letter back from the Department of Corrections 
[sic] about Mr. Beadz's status on his rider program and he is really up in 
the air because he was brought back for this trial. So, we need to get this 
resolved for your benefit, Mr. Beadz. 
Let me ask you, do you understand that you have the right to have 
a jury decide this case? What your counsel is telling me is that you want 
to waive that jury trial and let myself [sic] become the jury in effect. Is that 
what you want to do? 
5 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. I will accept that waiver .... 
(Supp.Tr., p.4, L.20 - p.5, L.8 (emphasis added).) 
Mr. Beadz asserts that his constitutional right to a jury trial was violated when his 
guilt was found by the district court, rather than a jury. The district court did not obtain a 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of Mr. Beadz's right to a jury trial before 
conducting a court trial. While Mr. Beadz did not object to the lack of a jury trial below, 
he asserts that the deprivation represents fundamental, structural error, and, therefore, 
can be considered for the first time on appeal. For the reasons set forth below, this 
Court should vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this matter for a new trial, 
or, in the alternative, for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether his oral waiver 
was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. 
B. Standards Of Review 
1. Fundamental Error 
In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court announced its 
adoption of a fundamental error analysis applicable to most unpreserved claims of 
constitutional violations. For most such claims, this Court will only provide relief if the 
defendant satisfies a three-prong test by establishing that the error "(1) violates one or 
more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the 
need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not 
harmless." Perry, 150 Idaho at 227-28. 
Some unpreserved constitutional errors - "structural defects" -- are of such 
magnitude that they defy the application of the harmless error test set forth by the 
6 
United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The 
constitutional rights underlying such structural defects "are so basic to a fair trial that the 
violation of those rights requires an automatic reversal and is not subject to harmless 
error analysis." Id. at 222 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991)). 
Structural defects are those "which affect 'the framework within which the trial proceeds, 
rather than simply an error in the trial process itself' and thus are so inherently unfair 
that they are not subject to harmless error analysis." Id. (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. 
at 307-08.) 
In Perry, this Court noted that the United States Supreme Court had only found 
the following errors to be structural: "(1) complete denial of counsel; (2) biased trial 
judge; (3) racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury; (4) denial of self-
representation at trial; (5) denial of a public trial; (6) defective reasonable doubt 
instruction; and (7) erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice." Id. (internal 
citations omitted). The Perry Court noted, "[a]lthough there may be other constitutional 
violations that would so affect the core of the trial process that they would require an 
automatic reversal, as a general rule, most constitutional violations will be subject to 
harmless error analysis." Id. at 222-23 (citation omitted). In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 
U.S. 275 (1993), the United States Supreme Court, discussing the right to a jury trial 
guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment, concluded, "[t]he deprivation of that right, with 
consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably 
qualifies as 'structural error."' Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281-82. 
2. Waiver Of A Constitutional Right 
"[T]he state has a heavy burden in overcoming a presumption against the waiver 
of constitutional rights." State v. Bainbridge, 108 Idaho 273, 276 (1985) (citation 
7 
omitted). On appeal, a waiver of a constitutional right "will be upheld if the entire record 
demonstrates the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." State v. 
Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 95 (2004); see also State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 498 (1983) 
(appellate court looks to the totality of the circumstances when assessing whether trial 
court properly found a valid waiver of a constitutional right). 
C. Mr. Beadz Was Deprived Of His Constitutional Right To A Jury Trial When The 
District Court Held A Court Trial In The Absence Of A Knowing, Intelligent, and 
Voluntary Waiver Of The Right 
Article I, Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution, in relevant part, provides, "[t]he right 
of trial by jury shall remain inviolate ... A trial by jury may be waived in all criminal 
cases, by the consent of all parties, expressed in open court .... " IDAHO CONST. Art. I 
§ 7. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in relevant part, provides, 
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Idaho Constitution provides 
greater protection of the right to a jury trial in a criminal case than the Sixth Amendment. 
See State v. Wheeler, 114 Idaho 97, 100-01 (Ct. App. 1988) (Sixth Amendment 
guarantees jury trial only for "serious, non-petty offense[s]," while Article I, Section 7 
guarantees jury trial for "all public offenses which are potentially punishable by 
imprisonment or where potential fines or other sanctions are punitive in nature") 
(citations omitted). 
In concluding that a criminal defendant may waive his Sixth Amendment right to 
a jury trial, the United States Supreme Court has explained that because the right is so 
important it must be "jealously preserved," and, "that, before any waiver can become 
effective, the consent of government counsel and the sanction of the court must be had, 
in addition to the express and intelligent consent of the defendant." Patton v. United 
8 
States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930), abrogated on other grounds by Williams v. Florida, 
399 U.S. 78 (1970) (emphasis added). The Court concluded by noting, "the duty of the 
trial court in that regard is not to be discharged as a mere matter of rote, but with sound 
and advised discretion, with an eye to avoid unreasonable or undue departures from" 
the preference for trial by jury, with the court's "caution increasing in degree as the 
offenses dealt with increase in gravity." Id. at 312-13. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 23(a) provides, "[i]n felony cases issues of fact must be tried 
by a jury unless a trial by jury is waived by a written waiver executed by the defendant in 
open court with the consent of the prosecutor expressed in open court and entered in 
the minutes." I.C.R. 23(a) (emphasis added). 
Several appellate courts have adopted colloquies that must be conducted before 
the right to a jury trial may be waived. In State v. Anderson, 638 N.W.2d 301 (Wis. 
2002), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered whether a defendant, who signed 
and filed a written jury trial waiver, which included information that he had the right to 
trial before a twelve person jury, all of whom must agree in order to render a verdict, but 
was never asked, in open court, whether he wished to waive his right to a jury trial, had 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. In holding that the 
record did not demonstrate a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver, the Court 
explained, 
To prove a valid jury trial waiver, the [trial] court must conduct a colloquy 
designed to ensure that the defendant: (1) made a deliberate choice, 
absent threats or promises, to proceed without a jury trial; (2) was aware 
of the nature of a jury trial, such that it consists of a panel of 12 people 
that must agree on all elements of the crime charged; (3) was aware of the 
nature of a court trial, such that the judge will make a decision on whether 
or not he or she is guilty of the crime charged; and (4) had enough time to 
discuss this decision with his or her attorney. 
9 
Anderson, 638 N.W.2d at 310. The Court explained that the colloquy requirement 
'"serves the dual purposes of ensuring that a defendant is not deprived of his 
constitutional rights and of efficiently guarding our scarce judicial resources."'4 Id. at 
309-10 (quoting State v. Klessig, 564 N.W.2d 716 (Wis. 1997)). In light of the 
defendant's execution of a written waiver, however, the Court declined to order a new 
trial, and instead remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing as to whether the 
defendant's jury trial waiver was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Id. at 
312. 
In Com. v. DeGeorge, 485 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 1984), the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania considered whether the failure to comply with a rule of criminal procedure 
mandating the procedure for waiving the right to a jury trial required remand for a new 
trial or for an evidentiary hearing. The rule provided that a criminal defendant, with the 
consent of his attorney and the approval of the trial court, could waive his right to a jury 
trial, with the following caveat: "[t]he judge shall ascertain from the defendant whether 
this is a knowing and intelligent waiver, and such colloquy shall appear on the record." 
DeGeorge, 485 A.2d at 1090-91 (emphasis and internal punctuation omitted). 
Concluding that the proper colloquy5 was not conducted, the Court nonetheless 
remanded for an evidentiary hearing because the existence of the signed written waiver 
4 The judicial resources referred to were those of appellate courts forced to search trial 
records for evidence of the validity of a waiver when no colloquy is conducted. 
5 Under Pennsylvania case law, a defendant must be made aware of the "essential 
ingredients, basic to the concept of a jury trial," specifically, "that the jury be chosen 
from members of the community (a jury of one's peers), that the verdict be unanimous, 
and that the accused be allowed to participate in the selection of the jury panel." 
Com. v. Williams, 312 A.2d 597, 600 (Pa. 1973); see also DeGeorge, 485 A.2d at 1091 
(noting Williams' requirement that a defendant waiving his right to a jury trial must be 
made aware of "the elements of a jury trial," specifically, "selection of jurors from the 
community, requirement of unanimous verdict and participation in selection of the jury"). 
10 
of the right to a jury trial provided some evidence that a valid waiver had been made. At 
such an evidentiary hearing, the trial court would be able to hear testimony concerning 
"the extent to which counsel and client may have conferred on that which was waived, 
or what colloquy was conducted at the time the written waiver was executed." Id. at 
1091-92 (footnote omitted). 
Several other appellate courts have held that some sort of colloquy, by which a 
defendant is informed of the nature of the right to a jury trial, should be conducted by 
the trial court. See Com. v. Hendricks, 891 N.E.2d 209, 218-19 (Mass. 2008) 
(upholding waiver in light of a colloquy which provided facts allowing the trial judge to 
find that the defendant "was aware of the differences between a jury and jury-waived 
trial, that he had not been coerced or improperly influenced in his decision, and that he 
was rationally capable of executing the waiver") (citation omitted); People v. Montoya, 
251 P.3d 35, 43-46 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010) (remanding to the trial court for an evidentiary 
hearing after finding that the trial court did not comply with rule of criminal procedure 
governing waivers of jury trial when it failed to "determine whether he understood that 
his decision to waive a jury trial was his alone and could be made contrary to his 
counsel's advice; that the waiver would apply to all issues that might have been 
determined by a jury, including those requiring factual findings at sentencing; and that 
the jury would have consisted of twelve persons who would be required to reach a 
unanimous verdict, whereas in a trial to the court, the judge alone would decide the 
verdict .... ")6; United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting 
6 The Montoya Court noted, "[d]espite the benefits to appellate courts of having a 
recorded colloquy between the trial court and the defendant in jury waiver cases, the 
overwhelming majority of federal and state courts, including those in Colorado, have 
held that such a colloquy is not constitutionally required. It is only a procedural device · 
that assists the court in resolving the constitutional issue of whether a jury trial waiver is 
11 
that there was "no absolute requirement" of a colloquy in every case, particularly those 
in which a written waiver has been filed, but noting that, prior to accepting any jury trial 
waiver, "[t]he district court should inform the defendant that (1) twelve members of the 
community compose a jury, (2) the defendant may take part in jury selection, (3) a jury 
verdict must be unanimous, and (4) the court alone decides guilt or innocence if the 
defendant waives a jury trial ... [and] question the defendant to ascertain whether the 
defendant understands the benefits and burdens of a jury trial and freely chooses to 
waive a jury") (internal citations omitted). 
Even in jurisdictions in which colloquies are not necessary, the appellate courts 
have adopted a totality of the circumstances test for determining whether a waiver of the 
right to a jury trial was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. In Davis v. State, 
809 A.2d 565 (Del. 2002), the Supreme Court of Delaware found no requirement that a 
colloquy be conducted in order to conclude that a written jury trial waiver was made 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Davis, 809 A.2d at 570. The Court did, 
however, adopt a prospective requirement that "[i]n the future, Delaware trial judges 
should conduct a colloquy with the defendant, in addition to accepting his or her written 
waiver of the right to a jury trial." Although it declined to specify the exact limits of such 
a colloquy, it noted, "[a]t a minimum, the trial judge should engage in an exchange with 
the defendant similar to the colloquy set forth by the Seventh Circuit," which includes an 
explanation "that a jury is composed of twelve members of the community, that the 
defendant may participate in the selection of jurors, and that the verdict of the jury is 
unanimous." Id. at 571-72 (citation omitted). 
made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently." Montoya, 251 P.3d at 41 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). 
12 
Similarly, in State v. Hassan, 108 P.3d 695 (Utah 2004), the Supreme Court of 
Utah noted that no colloquy was necessary in order to find a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial. However, the Court explained, "we maintain 
that a colloquy will help judges ascertain whether a defendant meets this standard." 
The Court also noted that such a colloquy "will allow for efficient and informed appellate 
review of those waivers," and it "encouraged our judges ... to conduct a colloquy 
before granting a waiver." Hassan, 108 P.3d at 699. In concluding that the totality of 
the circumstances indicated that Hassan had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
waived his right to a jury trial, the Court noted that the trial court had "advised Hassan of 
many implications of his waiver" prior to accepting it, and "was under no obligation to 
provide an exhaustive explanation of all the consequences of a jury waiver." Id. 
Mr. Beadz asserts that the totality of the circumstances in his case demonstrate 
that he did not make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury 
trial. Although no Idaho case stands for the proposition that a specific colloquy must be 
held before a trial court may accept a jury trial waiver, he asserts that the absence of 
any meaningful discussion of the features of a jury trial and the differences between a 
court and a jury trial, 7 along with the absence of the written waiver required under Idaho 
Criminal Rule 23(a), let alone one containing a description of the significance of the 
right, 8 renders his waiver constitutionally invalid. 
7 See State v. Powell, 120 Idaho 707, 710 (1991) ("A court trial obviously differs 
significantly from a jury trial"). 
8 In State v. Campbell, 131 Idaho 568 (Ct. App. 1998), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
declined to address the argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that a court trial 
conducted in a felony case without evidence of a written waiver of the right to a jury trial 
constituted reversible error. In so holding, the Court of Appeals noted, "Campbell does 
not complain that he was denied the right to a jury trial but merely that his informed 
waiver of that right was verbal rather than in writing. This assertion does not present a 
question of fundamental error." Campbell, 131 Idaho at 569 (emphasis added); but see 
13 
Additionally, the fact that the district court's questioning of Mr. Beadz regarding 
his desire to waive his right to a jury trial was preceded immediately by the district court 
implying that such a waiver was in his best interests is significant in determining the 
voluntariness of his waiver. (Supp.Tr., p.4, L.20 - p.5, L.1 ("I can certainly 
accommodate the parties doing that [having a court trial on Wednesday9]. In fact, I 
would like to because I just this afternoon received a letter back from the Department of 
Corrections [sic] about Mr. Beadz's status on his rider program and he is really up in the 
air because he was brought back for this trial. So, we need to get this resolved for your 
benefit, Mr. Beadz").) Such a statement may have unintentionally coerced Mr. Beadz 
into waiving his right to a jury trial. See People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297 (Cal. 2001) 
(despite detailed colloquy explaining nature of the right to a jury trial, jury trial waiver 
was rendered involuntary by trial court's promise of unspecified benefit if defendant 
waived his right to a jury trial). Given the district court's statement implying that it was in 
Mr. Beadz's best interests to waive his right to a jury trial so that the matter could be 
tried a week early, it can hardly be said that his waiver was voluntarily made without 
coercion or undue influence. 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Beadz submits that the record in this case 
does not demonstrate that his jury waiver was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
Wheeler, 114 Idaho at 101 ("The method of waiving a jury trial is a procedural matter 
and is also governed by rules promulgated by our Supreme Court. A waiver cannot be 
made or enforced unless it appears to have been made in conformance with the 
existing rule.") (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Mr. Beadz does not assert that the lack of a written waiver, by itself, renders his 
jury waiver constitutionally invalid; rather, he submits that its absence is one important 
circumstance in the totality indicating that his waiver was not knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily made. See Bainbridge, 108 Idaho at 276 ("[A]n express written 
statement of waiver [of a constitutional right], although not conclusive, is strong 
evidence of the voluntariness of the waiver.") (citation omitted). 
9 The case was set for a jury trial the following week. (Supp.Tr., p.3, Ls.8-9.) 
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made. As such, this matter should be remanded to the district court for a new trial. 
Alternatively, if this Court concludes that some evidence exists that the waiver was 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made, he respectfully requests that this Court 
remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing at which defense counsel can be 
questioned regarding what, if anything, he advised Mr. Beadz concerning his right to a 
jury trial and the significance of waiving that right. Additionally, for the sake of judicial 
efficiency, Mr. Beadz urges this Court to adopt a prospective rule requiring that a 
criminal defendant seeking to waive his right to a jury trial be informed - either in a 
written form or through an oral colloquy - concerning the nature of the right and the 
differences between a jury and a court trial in order for such a waiver to be valid. 
II. 
The Evidence Was Insufficient To Support Mr. Beadz's Conviction For Injury To A Jail 
Where The State Failed To Prove That He Intended To Cause Damage To The Jail 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Beadz asserts that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to 
establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he committed the offense of injury to a jail. 
Specifically, the State failed to adduce sufficient evidence to establish that he 
possessed the requisite intent to cause damage or injury to the jail. The judgment of 
conviction for injury to a jail must be vacated, and because the evidence was sufficient 
to support a conviction for the misdemeanor offense of malicious injury to property, this 
matter should be remanded to the district court for entry of a judgment of conviction on 
that lesser charge. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review for an appellate court when considering the sufficiency of 
the evidence to sustain a conviction was set forth in State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 823 
(Ct. App. 1992), in which the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that: 
A conviction will not be set aside where there is substantial evidence upon 
which any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, we construe all facts, 
and inferences to be drawn from those facts, in favor of upholding the 
jury's verdict. Where there is competent although conflicting evidence to 
sustain the verdict, we will not reweigh the evidence or disturb the verdict. 
Id. (citations omitted). "For evidence to be substantial, it must be of sufficient quality 
that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion." State v. Johnson, 131 Idaho 
808, 809 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 128 Idaho 580, 586 
(1996)). 
A verdict cannot be based on speculation or conjecture. See Ryan v. Beisner, 
123 Idaho 42, 46 (Ct. App. 1992) ("[A] verdict cannot rest on speculation or conjecture.") 
(citing Petersen v. Parry, 92 Idaho 647, 652 (1968)); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. 
Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 344 (1933) Uury's verdict cannot rest "upon mere 
speculation and conjecture"); United States v. Pinckney, 85 F .3d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[A] 
conviction cannot rest on mere speculation or conjecture."); United States v. Pettigrew, 
77 F.3d 1500, 1521 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[A] verdict may not rest on mere suspicion, 
speculation, or conjecture .... "); United States v. Jones, 49 F.3d 628, 632 (10th Cir. 
1995) ("We cannot permit speculation to substitute for proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Even though rational jurors may believe in the likelihood of the defendant's guilt, 
as they probably did in this case, they may not convict on that belief alone."); United 
States v. Diggs, 527 F.2d 509, 513 (8th Cir. 1975) ("[A] jury is not justified in convicting a 
defendant on the basis of mere suspicion, speculation or conjecture."); United States v. 
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Bethea, 442 F.2d 790, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("[T]he trial judge should not allow the case 
to go to the jury if the evidence is such as to permit the jury to merely conjecture or 
speculate as to defendant's guilt."); Karchmer v. United States., 61 F.2d 623 (ih Cir. 
1932) ("A verdict which finds its only support in conjecture and speculation cannot 
stand."). 
C. The Evidence Was Insufficient To Support Mr. Beadz's Conviction For Injury To 
A Jail Where The State Failed To Prove That He Intended To Cause Damage To 
The Jail 
Idaho Code§ 18-7018 provides: 
Every person who wilfully [sic] and intentionally breaks down, pulls down 
or otherwise destroys or injures any public jail or other place of 
confinement, is punishable by fine not exceeding $10,000, and by 
imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding five years. 
I.C. § 18-7018. 
In reaching its verdict, the district court discussed cases interpreting the 
malicious injury statute, 10 including State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 819 (2007). The district 
court explained its reliance on Doe as follows: 
The argument was made by the defense in that case, judge, I intended to 
start this fire, but I didn't intend to burn down the building. The court on 
appeal rejected that argument, as did the trial court, finding that the 
concept of transferred intent was sufficient to create criminal culpability for 
having placed in action the starting [of] the fire. 
By analogy in this case, by Mr. Beadz having struck the window, even 
though he may not, he says he may not have intended to break it, I think 
that is sufficient to withstand the argument that he didn't intend to injure 
the property. 
10 At the outset of its analysis, the district court explained, "I understand this is not a 
charge of malicious injury. So when I comment on some of these cases I'm about to 
comment on that have dealt with the malicious injury statute, the record should reflect 
that this judge understands that that word malicious is not defined and is not used in this 
statute. But, those cases are persuasive to me for what they have to say." (Tr., p.67, 
L.22 - p.68, L.4.) 
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(Tr., p.68, L.5 - p.69, L.3.) The district court then discussed State v. Nunes, 131 Idaho 
408 (Ct. App. 1998), and its reliance on it as follows, 
That was a case where the defendant attempted to steal some gasoline 
and he broke a lock on the tank that housed this gasoline. In doing that, it 
caused 250 gallons of gasoline to spill on the ground. So instead of being 
faced with a charge of damage for a lock, he was faced with a $13,500 bill 
for having caused damage by letting the gasoline out. Again, the 
argument was made, well, you bet I intended to break the lock, but I didn't 
intend to cause all of this other damage. On appeal the court rejected that 
argument, similar like they did in the Doe case and said, no, it's when you 
place in the stream of events some conduct, you essentially suffer the 
consequences criminally and legally for the consequences that occur. 
(Tr., p.69, Ls.8-21.) 
Ultimately, the district court found Mr. Beadz guilty, reasoning, 
Simply stated, Mr. Beadz, I'm going to find you guilty of this charge 
because I think that the state has proven to me, well, not think, I do find 
that the state has proven to me beyond a reasonable doubt that you 
intentionally injured that property. You were angry. There's no question 
about that in my mind. You were acting out. There is no question about 
that in my mind, but the only rationale I can come to as to why someone 
would strike their head against the window in the fashion that you did with 
as much force as you did was that you intended to cause some injury. 
Now maybe you didn't contemplate that that window was going to break. I 
certainly recognize your argument that maybe you were simply trying to 
get Deputy Benson's attention, but under the facts of this case, I think the 
state has satisfied their burden so I do enter a judgment of guilt in this 
case. 
(Tr., p.70, Ls.2-18.) 
The cases relied upon by the district court in finding Mr. Beadz guilty of injury to a 
jail can be easily distinguished from the facts of his case. In both Doe and Nunes, the 
Idaho Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, respectively, considered the malicious 
injury statute. That statute, Idaho Code § 18-7001, provides that a person is guilty of 
malicious injury if he "maliciously injures or destroys any real or personal property not 
his own .... " I.C. § 18-7001(1). The offense is a misdemeanor, unless the damage 
caused exceeds $1,000. I.C. § 18-7001 (2). The term "maliciously" is defined as "a wish 
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to vex, annoy, or injure another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act, established 
either by proof or presumption of law." Doe, 144 Idaho at 821 (quoting I.C. § 18-7001). 
The evidence in Doe was that Doe, a juvenile, intentionally set fire to some 
weeds in a field that was approximately thirty feet from an apartment building. Despite 
attempts to put out the fire, it spread to the apartment building, causing damage to the 
building and the personal property of a tenant. At the juvenile adjudication hearing and 
on appeal, counsel for Doe argued that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence 
that he had "maliciously intended to destroy the apartment building or the contents or 
the [victim's] apartment." Id. at 820-21. In analyzing this argument, the Court noted, "It 
was uncontroverted that Doe intentionally set the weeds in the vacant lot on fire and 
that the fire then spread to the apartment building, burning it and the contents of the 
Hankins' apartment. It is also uncontroverted that he did not intend to burn the 
apartment building or its contents." Id. Applying the common law doctrine of 
transferred intent, the Court noted that the evidence was sufficient to show that Doe 
committed the offense because "[i]n this case, Doe intentionally set fire to property not 
his own (the weeds in the vacant lot) and the fire spread to other property (the 
apartment complex and the personal property in the apartment)." Id. at 821-22. 
In Nunes, the Court of Appeals considered the malicious injury statute. Nunes 
was charged with felony malicious injury as a result of his attempt to steal gasoline from 
a large fuel tank. The undisputed evidence, set forth by the Court of Appeals, was that 
Nunes, intending to break the lock on the tank's valve, "instead broke the valve at the 
bottom of the tank, causing about 250 gallons of gasoline to spill onto the ground. The 
mandatory environmental cleanup of the spilled gasoline cost the corporate victim 
approximately $13,500." Nunes did not dispute that he had committed misdemeanor 
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malicious injury to property based on his intent to break the lock, but argued that the 
State failed to adduce sufficient evidence to establish that he had the requisite intent to 
cause damage in an amount exceeding $1,000. Nunes, 131 Idaho at 408. 
In analyzing this claim, the Court of Appeals noted that the $1,000 provision that 
causes malicious injury to be elevated to a felony "does not include any state of mind 
component ... [and thus] does not specify that the degree of damage must have been 
intended in order for the offense to be a felony." In rejecting Nunes' argument, the 
Court of Appeals explained, "the malice element is satisfied by evidence that the 
defendant intended to injure the property of another, and the State is not required to 
prove that the defendant intended the particular degree or scope of injury that ensued 
from his acts." It noted that its holding was "in accord with the generally recognized 
principle that '[w]ith the crime of malicious mischief, it makes no difference whether A 
intends to injure B's property but actually destroys it, or intends to destroy but actually 
only injures it."' Id. at 409-10 (quoting LAFAVE & SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL 
LAW, § 3.11, p.387 (1986)) (italics and brackets in original). 
Unlike the facts in both Doe and Nunes, the evidence concerning Mr. Beadz's 
intent is not uncontroverted. While it was undisputed that Mr. Beadz slammed his head 
into the window of a jail cell, causing the window to break, Mr. Beadz's intent to cause 
injury was in substantial dispute. Mr. Beadz immediately told his jailers that he did not 
intend to break the window (Tr., p.51, Ls.8-17), and the next day told the authorities that 
his "head wasn't supposed to go through that glass." (Tr., p.54, L.15 - p.55, L.11.) The 
State argued that it did not have to show that Mr. Beadz intended to cause any damage 
to the window, instead, arguing that the statute's terms willfully and intentionally were 
"synonymous," and that it merely had to show that Mr. Beadz voluntarily and 
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intentionally slammed his head into the window. According to the State, to hold 
otherwise would allow criminal defendants to obtain acquittals by successfully arguing 
that they did not intend to cause the resulting injury. (Tr., p.65, L.13 - p.66, L.2.) 
Ultimately, the district court held that the mere fact that he slammed his head into the 
window was evidence that he intended to cause "some injury,"11 and was, therefore, 
sufficient to establish, under Doe and Nunes, that he had committed the offense. 
(Tr., p. 70, Ls.2-18.) 
The problem with the district court's reasoning and reliance on Doe and Nunes is 
that it is misplaced. In both Doe and Nunes, it was undisputed that the defendants 
intended to cause specific injury to property. The only issues in those cases were 
whether the intent to cause the specific injury in Doe could transfer to other property (it 
could), and whether an intent to cause a specific amount of property damage was 
required to be proven to elevate malicious injury from a misdemeanor to a felony (it was 
not). Neither case dealt with the situation at bar; namely, a case in which it is in dispute 
whether the State established an intent to cause any injury to any property. The State 
argued that it did not have to show that Mr. Beadz had the intent to cause any resulting 
property damage; from that argument it can be inferred that the State did not believe 
that it had adduced sufficient evidence that he intended to cause injury to the jail. 
Ultimately, in concluding that the State had met its burden of proof, the district court 
erroneously relied on principles from Doe and Nunes that are inapplicable to the facts of 
11 The district court never identified the type of injury it believed Mr. Beadz intended to 
cause by slamming his head into the cell window. Mr. Beadz asserts that, to the extent 
that it formed an alternative basis for the finding of guilt, this conclusion should be 
disregarded, as it is unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. 
See State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 851 (2001) (legal conclusion reached by a district 
court "will not be disturbed on appeal unless it can be shown that such a conclusion is 
not supported by substantial and competent evidence") (citations omitted). 
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this case. Consequently, Mr. Beadz respectfully requests that this Court vacate the 
judgment of conviction, and remand this matter to the district court for entry of a 
conviction for misdemeanor malicious injury to property. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Beadz respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter to the district court for entry 
of a conviction for misdemeanor malicious injury to property. If this Court finds that the 
evidence was sufficient to support the felony verdict, he respectfully requests that this 
Court vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for a jury trial. 
Alternatively, he requests that this Court remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing 
regarding whether his jury trial waiver was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. 
DATED this 31 st day of August, 2012. 
SPENCER J. HAHN.) 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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